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I. Introduction
Much political and scholarly energy has been spent in understanding
the nature and impacts of political boundaries on African development
and public life. The standard argument by many anticolonial groups
is that the Berlin Conference that instigated the European scramble for
Africa in the 19th century paid no attention to the geography of African livelihood experiences.2 Drawing boundaries engulfing territories
claimed by various Europeans was arbitrary, and the legacy of their
existence has caused much grief in the continent.3 It is a fact that colonial boundaries in Africa were artificial, but it is also the case that all
political boundaries nearly everywhere are not natural.
Most of these studies underscore how artificial colonial borders segmented communities that shared economic, ecological and cultural
resources. In some cases, these boundaries have been the “cause”
of inter-state conflicts between post-colonial countries, i.e., Ethiopia
and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia; Kenya and Somalia; Algeria and
Morocco; Libya and Chad. But other equally artificial borders in the
continent have not incited similar conflagrations despite fragmenting
cultural, religious and ethnic groups, such as the Massai of Kenya and
Tanzania, and the many communities that straddle along the borders of
South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, etc. An unexplored
question that demands urgent attention is why conflicts develop over
some borders and not over others in different parts of the continent.4
As important as this question is, this paper examines a related but
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different issue: the ways in which the political and economic systems
that colonial powers designed and imposed on Africa instigated processes that have generated social and political discord, which has led
to different types of conflicts within countries.5 Such conflicts have
forestalled the flourishing of civic culture and an accountable system
of government in the continent.6
African elites’ self-serving political economic behavior has reified
the colonial system of governance and consequently produced acrimonious internal divisions that appear to be even more destructive than
those artificial international borders. African and Africanist scholars
have broached the ways in which ethnicity as a cultural feature was
transformed into state-driven political identity to facilitate the colonial agenda of “divide and rule.”7 Deepening political ethnicity and
the associated regime of accumulation and underdevelopment in the
post colony have exacerbated political cleavages in ways that colonial
masters and the architects of apartheid could only have fantasized
about. Political divisions induced this way call for a critical examination of elite driven processes that are generating nasty borders within
countries. Further, political ethnicity has created opportunities, as Berman has pointed out, for the political and economic elite to hoodwink
the underclass in their communities to support the former’s schema
regardless of the fact this agenda has had dire consequences for the
poor:
For ordinary people the central problem lies in their day-to-day contacts
with local authorities and agents of the state where they cannot expect
disinterested competence and fairness. Instead, they expect and mostly
get incompetence, bias, venality and corruption. So long as this persists,
they cannot develop the critical relations of trust in their dealings with
the state, and will continue to rely on the personalized, protective ties of
clientalism. Without displacement of decentralized despotism … limitation on the opportunities for accumulation and patronage through the
state apparatus, and effective accommodation of the reality of ethnic
pluralism in formal political institutions, there can be little hope of fundamental change moving more clearly towards modernity.8 [emphasis
added]
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Without buying into Berman’s profoundly pessimistic proposition,
and particularly his assumption that the systems he describes are
not “modern,”9 it is difficult to disagree with the broader analysis he
and other scholars have laid out regarding the transformation of the
relations between accumulation, the state, and political ethnicity. The
original traps set up by the European colonialist have been adopted,
reinforced, and deepened by the elite as two of Africa’s eminent novelists, the Ghanaian Armah and Kenyan Ngugi wa Thiong’o,10 so painfully portrayed in their respective novels, “The Beautiful Ones are Not
Yet Born,” and “The Devil on the Cross.” The political and economic
strategy of members of the post-colonial elite has been to use public
authority as the means to prolong their grip on power in order to
enhance their accumulation of wealth. In so doing, they use political ethnicity and patronage politics to maintain sufficient followings
among the population. Such a strategy has impeded the development
of civic bonds among ethnic communities that could challenge the
established order and foster trust-based relationship between government and the population. Consequently, elite centered politics has produced a whole new set of boundaries (political, cultural, spatial, and
economic) that have undermined the very foundation of the nationalist
project and the essence of liberation even among the most ethnically
homogenous countries.
This essay demonstrates the ways in which colonial strategies of
divide and rule in one particular African country, Somalia – arguably the continent’s culturally most homogenous country – were resuscitated and strengthened by victorious factions of the political elite.
Their political practice created social fissure that has induced the proliferation of internal boundaries that are pushing the country into an
ever deeper and absurd fragmentation. This condition continues to
alienate communities from each other on genealogical basis despite the
glaring fact that the population’s economic, social, cultural, and political interests are almost identical.
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II. Origins of Borders in the Land of the Somalis
Somalia (meaning the Somali Republic) has gone through multidimensional political, economic, and cultural mutations over the last
three decades due to the searing violence that has afflicted nearly
all parts of the country. These bloody maneuvers have shaped the
political-economic order of the country in ways that would have been
unimaginable before the national government collapsed in 1991.11
Among the many consequences of the catastrophic civil war is a reimagination of the relations between politics and culture in the minds
of the political class, while the vast majority of the population remains
disenfranchised. Such a vision has turned the original political dream
of Somalia inside out and created internal borders leading to the formation of a new “tribal federalism.” The rest of the paper narrates
the political dynamics that produced ethnic federalism, ascertains the
potential consequences of such a system for the Somali people, and
reflects on what this means for the study of borders in Africa.
The social and political organization of pre-colonial Somali society was less hierarchical than most societies in this region of Africa,
such as Ethiopia. In the main, there were no chiefly traditions where
authority rested on the direct or indirect alienation of land or livestock
– the economic base of society. The basic social unit was the extended
household, which had relatively unimpeded access, use, and control
of grazing and farming land, as well as water resources. Livestock
was ‘owned’ by the household and the harsh and semi-arid environment induced households to cooperate in herding livestock together,
developing and maintaining water wells, managing and exploring the
rangelands, and circulating livestock to wider kin groups in order to
minimize the deleterious impacts of ecological perturbations. As such,
the geography of Somalis’ pre-colonial order had ecological zones (and
no hard political boundaries) as was the case in many parts of the continent.12 Hence, the Somali landscape was a wide-open territory with
grazing and cultivation zones, which were accessible to all community
members except during times of exceptional circumstances. Map 1
depicts the extent of Somali territory without internal borders in the
pre-colonial era.
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Map 1: Land of Somalis Before Colonial Partition

Despite the open nature of the Somali commons, the culture exhibited
three features of inequality. First, the distribution of the livestock herd
among the community was determined by the managerial skills, luck,
and location of a household in the network of exchange and position
in the family cycle. Second, patriarchy was a major defining feature
of the cultural, economic, and political life in Somali society. Women
and girls had less freedom of movement as well as control of livestock and other resources. Third, older men occupied the pinnacle of
the social ladder and had significant command over the endowment
of the household as well as the fortunes of their sons and daughters.
Consequently, adult men constituted the elders and decision-makers
of the community.13 Although this social order was hierarchically gendered and age-based, the rule of the elders was democratic in nature
and their edicts could only be enforced through social sanctions in the
absence of established police and other coercive tools of a state. The
elders, then, had much less direct authority over the community and
individuals than the more stratified chiefdoms and monarchs elsewhere in the East Africa region, such as Uganda.
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The pre-colonial households and network-based economic system
was an integral part of the larger political and moral order. This system
was bounded by the older tenets of kinship ethics and the guidelines
of the Islamic faith. Kinship had two constituent elements. These were
the customary law known as Xeer and the ties that were a product of
genealogy (Tol) or marriage (Xidid). Xeer was the Somali-wide social
contract that governed communal and individual codes of conduct.
The Xeer and teachings of Islam superseded the potential divisiveness
of male genealogy (Tol). Furthermore, the web of relationships created by intermarriage (Xidid) reinforced the community-wide spirit of
Xeer and Islam and thus blunted the fissures sometimes triggered by
narrow genealogical calculations.14 The household, Islam, and the kinbased political economic and moral order of pre-colonial Somalis did
not prevent conflicts between communities, but it certainly precluded
prolonged hostilities driven by ‘tribal’ chauvinism. In this era, then,
there were no hard boundaries that forbade trespassing, and even the
limits of Somali territory gave way to transitional zones to their Afar
and Oromo neighbors in what is contemporary Djibouti, Ethiopia, and
Kenya.15
This tradition went through radical metamorphosis as the land
of the Somalis came under colonial occupation in the 1880s which
engendered the formation of political boundaries slicing their land into
five colonial segments: British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Italian
Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland, and the Northern Frontier Districts
of the Kenya colony.16 Thus, with the mere stroke of the pen Somalis
from one region became foreigners in other parts of their old territory
(Map 2). These administrations instituted genealogical elders as tribal
chiefs who then became vassals of their respective administration.17
The primary role of the Aqils (chiefs) was to be a hyphen between the
state and the ‘tribesmen.’ But Somali chieftains lacked an autonomous
and legitimate political base as they did not possess resources of their
own and consequently depended on the colonial state. In effect, the
chiefs acted as the employees of the state and rarely challenged the dictates of their employer in any significant way.18 Somali chiefs became
a central cog to the colonial order. Their ability to command some
respect and authority among the Somali people was contingent on: (a)
the few favors they extracted from the administration to distribute to
the community, and (b) their capacity to call on the coercive power of
the state to discipline those natives who transgressed chiefly authority.
Notwithstanding such weakness, colonial chieftainship in the Somalilands had fundamental impacts that vastly exceeded its material and
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moral deficiencies. The constellation of the colonial state, colonial
chiefs, tribalization of the moral and political order, and slow commercialization of the pastoral and peasant economy transformed the
very nature of Somali social order. First, the onset of the colonial state
as the center of political authority created at once a unifying and divisive pan-Somali bureaucratic authoritarian structure. This entailed the
formation of a forum, with a somewhat colonial imprint, for discussing
Somali-wide issues that enabled various elements of Somali society
to overcome their relative isolation from one another.19 Second, this
new context significantly diminished the vitality of the kinship-Islamic
based moral order, and the establishment of Italian and British colonial
systems not only superseded old traditional identities, but also generated parochial mentalities and petty conflicts within the new circumstances. For example, the ‘legal’ prerequisite for any individual Somali
to be a legitimate subject of the new order was membership in a ‘tribal’
group under the leadership of a chief. This novel political hierarchy
composed of subject, tribe, chief, and colonial administration created
identities undergirded by a supportive incentive and authority system.20
Map 2: Land of the Somalis After Colonial Partition
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Unlike the old communal arrangements in which the elders did not
control a coercive machine or wield economic clout over the community, the imposition of colonialism on the Somali removed the
major social means of restraining those in position of authority. Third,
while engaged in the process of reinventing or modernizing tradition,
the colonial state also induced commoditization of the basic sources
and social restructuring. On the economic front, livestock and other
resources of subsistence gained monetary value and became objects of
trade and accumulation. Moreover, this process produced new social
groups, such as merchants, other elements of the growing urban population, and employees of the state. These groups, particularly the merchants and state employees, least encumbered by the old folkways,
found access to relatively secure and independent means of livelihoods. Such development had positive and negative consequences,
including a gradual emergence of relations between many members
of this group regarding their pan-Somali interests. As the intensity
of their contact grew, it facilitated the development of a shared and
modern Somali identity that challenged the tribal thrust of the colonial
project.21
The British and Italian colonial states in the two territories did not
draw administrative boundaries within each territory along tribal lines
due to the significant intermingling of various genealogical groups.
For example, in British Somaliland the six districts of Burao, Erigavo,
Berbera, Hargeisa, Borama, and Las Anood did not reflect any established ‘tribal’ divisions, as none had any traditional moorings. Instead,
all the districts were named after the major towns in each unit. It is
instructive to compare this to Botswana where districts were named
after ethnic groups. In Italian Somaliland, the pattern was similar, even
with the seeming exception of Majeertinia.22 Thus, the colonial project set in motion contradictory social, economic and political forces
that concurrently emphasized tribalism and nationalism, and subsistence and commercialization. It seems, in hindsight, that these forces
morphed into two competing political tendencies in the post-colonial
republic as shown in Figure 1. One of these proclivities emphasized
Somali-wide ideas, identity, and systematic pursuit of national objectives, while the second was steeped in insular and sectarian interests
without much regard for the larger community.
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Figure 1: Political Tendencies in Somalia
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The contradiction between inclusive versus the insular/tribalist trajectories was embedded in the fabric of the late colonial period. Which
scenario prevailed essentially depended on the way in which political
conflicts among the new Somali elite were resolved and how its leadership managed public affairs. As a matter of fact, the fault-line of future
struggles could be observed in the first legislative elections in British
Somaliland. First, although a tribalist element was present in the political process and to some degree in the main political party in the Protectorate, the Somali National League (SNL), others such as National
United Front (NUF), United Somali Party (USP), and the Somali Youth
League (SYL) were arguing for a more inclusive agenda. This division
was apparent from the results of the legislative election. Among the
individuals elected to the legislative council in Hargeisa, the center
of the SNL, were two ‘Ogaden and Tumal kinsmen.’ If genealogical
identity was significant in the election, then, neither candidate had
any chance of winning, as their kin-groups were, at best, statistically
insignificant minorities.23 The second issue that signaled that myopic
forces were not ascendant was the fact that the Protectorate Legislative
Council voted to send a mission to Mogadishu with the mandate to
negotiate with leaders in Italian Somaliland for the unification of the
two Somali lands.
The social organization of the elite and the quality of its leadership
played a central role in shaping dominant scenarios in independent
Somalia. Culturally and religiously, the Somali elite is homogenous
with differences mostly in local habits and dialects-cum accent in the
language. Such widely shared cultural values provided a potential
basis for a Somali-wide agenda. Thus, the transfer of parts of British
Somaliland to Ethiopia by the British in the mid-1950s breathed life
into the inert nationalist spirit in the Protectorate. The anti-colonial
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movement, which this event induced sufficiently, galvanized the public and gave momentum to the civic propensity of the Somali body
politic. This process and heightened decolonization activities in the
Trusteeship territory generated sufficient nationalist energy to lead to
the unification of two Somalilands (Map 3).
Map 3: Unification of British & Italian Somalilands

28

Abdi Ismail Samatar

III. Regionalism in the Democratic Era
The ascendant nationalist movement that culminated in independence
and unification, the intense fervor that accompanied it and the social
unity that it signaled were palpable. However, the longevity of this
current was susceptible to the divisive and sectarian tendencies also
embedded in colonial Somali society. Somalia’s elite, which consisted
of merchants, bureaucrats, and politicians, was an unstable social
stratum. The brevity of its individual and collective social experience
and the shallowness of its material base, both as individuals and as a
cohort, compounded their vulnerability and acute intra-group rivalry.
Most members of this class’s insecurity immeasurably added to the
internal incoherence of the group and absence of relatively lasting consensus about the collective national project. Such conditions obviated
the emergence of legitimate and stable leadership that could ensure
discipline amongst them. The internal structure and dynamics of the
elite generated a vicious survivalist undertow that triggered an opportunistic agenda over the systematic interest of the elite as a “class for
itself.” This posture predisposed a majority of the elite to be smallminded in their strategy that, in turn, dovetailed with the partisan and
tribalist paradigm inherited from the colonial period. The confluence
of individualistic and sectarian tendencies molded a volatile political
and economic environment in which most political leaders felt insecure in their tenure at the top of the hierarchy and attempted to exploit
it while in command. This was further exaggerated by the fact that
the majority of those individuals in strategic positions of leadership
were not willing to take the risk of standing up against the survivalist
stampede. High anxieties of self-interest became intimidatingly real, as
most of these leaders had neither the resources nor the skills to maintain their standard of living in the event that they forfeited their official
position. Africa’ first post-colonial leader to leave office peacefully and
democratically summed up the unseemly behavior of these actors:
… I am told that our country is unfortunate with the irresponsible
behavior of many of its men, who continue to see the problems of the
country only in terms of their own interests and how it can further that
concern. …The same old trick, ever since 1959, is repeated today …, and
therefore it is clear that they do not grow up! God save Somalis from the
starving beasts in human form that are the supposed ‘representatives of
the people.24
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The parochialism of this tendency and hyper-insecurity of politicians
reinforced each other and created a schismatic and destructive alliance.
Such an alliance did not immediately ride rough shod over the civic
nationalist group and tendency in the immediate post-independence
period. Yet, Somalia’s political and social profiles over the last fifty
years display the tug-of-war between these two perspectives and their
correlated political forces. Table 1 summarizes the different phases of
this struggle between the civics and their nemeses.25 The fleeting civic
spirit of the immediate post-colonial moment provided some initial
basis for the articulation of a precarious collective project. The only
other, and equally brief, period of civic consensus among the elite
came with the first few years of the military order.
Table 1: Struggle among the Political Elite
Regime

Elite
Unity

Conscious
leaders

Legitimacy

Clarity of
strategy

Institution
building
Yes:
integration
Yes:
civil service
reform

1960-64

High

Low/high

High

Yes

1964-67

Medium

High

High

Yes

1967-69

Low

Low

High/low

No

No

1969-77

High

Low

High

Yes

No

1977-91

Low

Low

Low

No

No

1991-

No

No

No

No

No

Harmony among the elite in these periods (1960-67 and 1969-77) was
a product of (a) the euphoric effects of independence and the absence
of previous conflicts among the elite at the national level; and (b) the
overthrow of the utterly corrupt and despised civilian government
in 1969. The period immediately after independence coincided with
the first regime of President Aden A. Osman and his prime ministers
Abdirashid A. Sharmarke and Abdirazak H. Hussen. The latter two
were heads of government and as such directed its operations. While
the regime faced some opposition, it enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy and popular support. However, the seeming consensus within
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the regime concealed serious differences between the President and
the first Prime Minister. Still, both of them and their partners were
committed to not expanding the administrative burden on the country
and kept their focus on integration.26 President Osman did not fire
the Prime Minister Sharmarke once their political differences became
clear, but waited until the strategic time after the 1964 national parliamentary election. He acted this way to avoid destabilizing the functioning of the government and reifying emerging political factions.27
The election marked a watershed in the political annals of the country;
it exposed the ascendancy and strength of the sectarian forces, as well
as the attempt by civic nationalists to resist the onslaught by the former. Political parties who fielded candidates in the election grew to
24 in number. However, only four parties won seats in parliament.
President Osman decided to shift the debate by nominating Abdirazak
H. Hussen as Prime Minister. Once confirmed, Hussen and his government pursued an activist and transformative civic agenda that shook
the political landscape in the country. Three qualities distinguished
the new government from its predecessor. First, members of the new
cabinet were appointed mainly on the basis of their professional skills.
Second, a significant number of key portfolios went to northerners
breaching the regionalist political divides in the country. Third, the
government adopted far-reaching civil service reforms, which shocked
the foundation of the bureaucratic elite. This progressive civic agenda
lasted for three and half years.
In spite of the strong agreement between the President, the new PM,
and the cabinet, many deputies were opposed to the civic agenda as it
constrained license to abuse public resources. The latter group fixed
their sights on the presidential election of 1967 and saw it as the opportunity to defeat the civic program. Their tactic was to rally around
former PM Sharmarke, who had his own ambition to replace President
Osman. Sharmarke immediately promised, if elected, the premiership
to another major political figure: Egal. This coalition inaugurated levels of corruption never seen before – offers of cash and ministerial
portfolios were made to MPs to win their votes. The Sharmarke/Egal
approach worked and President Osman and his team were defeated by
a handful of votes in 1967.28
President Sharmarke and Premier Egal understood the volatility
of the political and electoral process. Consequently, they started planning for the 1969 parliamentary election. Political members of the elite
failed to be united by anything except their own proclivity to trade
31

Bildhaan

Vol. 20

off any public resource for private gain. Government leaders, having fueled this tendency during the presidential election, knew the
only way that they could maintain some control was to appeal to the
material interests of each individual MP and, thus, tantalized them
with rewards and promises. It quickly became apparent to the public
that the Sharmarke-Egal government was swiftly and conspicuously
becoming corrupt.29 This set in motion a precipitous decline in popular legitimacy. Furthermore, its hold on power became dependent on
attending to the ‘personalist’ welfare of MPs. This exercise so thoroughly absorbed the government’s attention that little else was done
during the period between the 1967 presidential and the 1969 parliamentary elections. Though the regime did not directly dismantle the
Civil Service reform enacted by the Hussen government, it simply let
it wither on the vine. In the end, the systematic and institutionalized
campaign against corruption and incompetence also became a thing of
the past. The competition for parliamentary seats in the 1969 election
proved that the sectarian and tribalist factions of the elite had gained
the upper hand. The ideals and the strategy of the nationalist wing of
the political elite were battered and lay in ruins. As a measure of the
flea market-like ambience and level of political disarray, 61 political
parties competed for 123 seats. All but one of the “opposition parties”
that won 50 seats quickly and voluntarily joined the governing SYL
party. Only former Premier Hussen and his party retained the status
of opposition. Somalia became the first contemporary African country
in which a democratically elected opposition decided to unite with the
ruling party to create a “one” party state. Despite the proliferation of
political parties and candidates for parliament, the growth in corruption in the public sector and the deterioration of professionalism in the
civil service, the Sharmarke-Egal regime share one notable characteristic with Somalia’s pioneering democrats: notwithstanding tremendous political pressure on these governments to placate followers by
expanding administrative portfolios and create make-believe jobs, they
resisted further inflation of the country’s regional administrative units.
Thus, Somalia retained its original eight administrative regions until
the early 1980s (Map 4).
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Seven months after the parliamentary election, and spurred by the
assassination of the President by a member of his own police guard,
the military staged a coup. The public enthusiastically welcomed the
change. Initially, the leaders of the military regime seemed representative of a cross section of the country. They established more schools in
all parts of the country, created the Somali National University, and
much needed infrastructure building was undertaken. These accomplishments received enormous public elation and the junta’s legitimacy
was further enhanced by the effective way it dealt with the devastating
drought of 1975-4-5, and the adoption of orthography for the, until
then oral, Somali language.30
Map 4: Regional Administrative Region

33

Bildhaan

Vol. 20

IV. Military Dictatorship & Proliferation of Internal Boundaries
Public support for these development initiatives and the enveloping
general civic mobilization were reminiscent of the halcyon days of
independence. But, by the middle of the 1970s, as Ahmed Samatar had
written, telling cracks appeared between the regime’s rhetorical claims
and the realities on the ground.31 First, the leader, General Siyad Barre,
began to sideline his colleagues and to appoint friends and relatives to
strategic positions in the armed forces. Second, he and his associates
unilaterally placed their friends and relatives in key civil service and
ministerial offices. These acts completely shattered whatever legitimacy the regime had accumulated and began to erode the integrity of
public service. Soon, the regime began to change the regional administrative structure of the country by creating ten more regions during the
next decade (Map 5). No feasibility studies were carried out to assess
the need for more administrative regions. Indeed, it used authoritarian
fiat to justify its agenda. The regime had two simultaneous objectives
that were behind such expansion: to fragment the opposition in the
country by creating competing administrative regions and rewarding
its allies by giving them political and economic platforms.
Such an arbitrary way of managing public issues convinced the
majority of the Somali people that state affairs were being run for the
benefit of a few senior leaders, their associates and for specific “genealogical communities.” This system of administrations brought forth
new forms of conflicts, which destabilized the country. Ultimately, the
consequence was the birth of militarized opposition, mobilized on the
basis of ethnic politics. Among the first such groups were the Somali
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). These two groups claimed to represent the Somali people
against the regime, although it was rather obvious to most Somalis that
their declarations were undermined by sectarian animus
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Map 5: Proliferation of Administrative Region under the Military

The relief and reunion that the public, mistakenly, expected with the
demise of the military dictatorship never materialized. On the contrary, a new level of vicious scramble for leadership and dominance
commenced once the old order was demolished and its leader, literally, chased out of town. As the bloodletting between two competing
factions in Mogadishu intensified, the rest of the country fell into the
hands of ‘regional’ militias, warlords and sectarian strongmen. The
northern region taken over by SNM declared its ‘independence’ unilaterally. All over the country, in the place of one dictator appeared
many self-appointed and power-hungry individuals. The sole objective of each was to create a tribal fiefdom to facilitate a takeover of the
presidency of a country that had almost evaporated as a political unit.
Their unwillingness to strike a compromise that would have allowed
for national resurrection and reconstruction was demonstrated by the
failure of fourteen ‘national’ conferences for reconciliation. For nearly
fifteen years, warlords and self-proclaimed big men created vicious
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local tyranny in most parts of the country. Life for the majority of the
population became nasty and brutal, and without an end in sight. In
2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UICs) mobilized the population in
and around Mogadishu and liberated the city from the violent savagery of the warlords. The UICs articulated a mixture of Islamism and
nationalism that won over most of the people, even those in the far
reaches of the country. To be sure, the six months of political sway by
the UICs were quite short. Still, their intervention, despite some shortcomings in vision and management, their presence shifted the debate
from one of tribal fiefdoms to national issues. Whatever the promise of
that effort, it was short-circuited by the USA endorsed Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Mogadishu, resulting in the defeat of the UICs
on December 25, 2006. Immediately, the old sectarian politics came
back with vengeance. In this context, narcissistic “big men” fueled by
tribal improvisations jostled for power. In the meantime, generalized
political disenchantment and the fragmentation of the country rolled on.
V. From National Re-liberation to Tribal Involution
Elements of the sectarian elite who brought down the military regime
scrambled for power, which made the life of ordinary citizens even
worse as all public institutions disintegrated. Their zero-sum struggles
led to the fragmentation of the country. The SNM was the first to
declare the northern region (Somaliland) as a totally separate and sovereign country in 1991 (still unrecognized in 2020), while the factions in
Mogadishu and much of the south were engaged in a horrid civil war.
In 1998, the northeast of the country announced a self-governing province, which ultimately became Puntland. Two other provinces were
formed, Jubaland and Southwest in 2015. Many political actors and
communities contest the legitimacy of these regions. Similarly, another
cohort of politicians who contest the independence and integrity of
Somaliland had announced the formation of another state, Khatumo,
in the eastern part of Somaliland. Two more states have been formed in
2014 and 2016, namely Galmudug and Hirshabelle (Map 6).
From all the evidence available, it appears that the forces behind the
formation of these regions are the sectarian actors bent on to creating
political platforms which will position them to effectively compete
for national stature as well as give them unimpeded access to public
resources for themselves and their clients regardless of the terrible
economic, political, and social consequences of this divisive territorial
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restructuring of the country. The African Union, the United Nations,
neighboring states (particularly Kenya and Ethiopia), and the United
States and the EU have endorsed a tribalist political agenda that has
given “legitimacy” to the establishment of ethnic-based federal system.
Two regions (Somaliland and Puntland) provide examples of the political dynamics and the centrifugal forces that are turning the country
and the life of the people into a political nightmare.
Map 6: Proposed Federal Regions

In the North, due to a combination of exceptionally bad governance
in the region and particular brutality meted out to the population by
the military regime, a number of people from W. Galbeed and Togdheer formed the SNM to drive the regime out of power. But like the
other ‘liberation’ movements from the Northeast (now Puntland) and
South-Central, the SNM was a tribal-based group that pretended to
have a national civic agenda. Lest other Somalis might fight against its
separatist agenda, then, the SNM did not articulate such intentions for
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the region during the struggle against the dictatorship. However, once
the regime was disposed of, SNM hastily declared the independence
of ‘Somaliland.’ Because of the tribalist orientation of the Somaliland
project, communities in eastern and western zones of the territory have
been inimical towards the secessionist idea. After several years of violent struggles and political disorientation, Somaliland gained stability
and peace. This was the result of, among other, two main and converging factors: (a) the leadership of Somalia’s last democratically elected
Prime Minister, Mohamed I. Egal, who returned to his region of birth,
was voted in to become the president of the region in 1993; and (b)
the consequent creation of relatively workable governance procedures
and institutions. Egal’s deployment of his deep experience and crafty
contributions set the foundations for reconciliation and order in the
region. He died in office in 2002. While Somaliland ought to be noted
for its relative success more than any other region in the country, it is
not immune to the undertow of centrifugal sentiments and political
forces. The consequences of these include increasing territorial subdivision of the area into fourteen sectarian regions primarily reflecting
genealogical identities as shown in Map 7. Despite the claims of the
Hargeisa-based administration that the “Somaliland Republic” encompasses all the former northern region of the Somali Republic, the reality on the ground is that the eastern quarter of the region is not under
its control and is now called “Khatumo state.”
Map 7: Regions with Somaliland
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The authorities in Puntland claim that it encompasses northern
Mudug, all of Bari, Nugal, and Sool regions, and much of Sanaag.
Somaliland and the recently formed Glamudug Federal Region in central Somalia challenge these territorial claims as well. Wherever the
boundaries might be, Puntland was created in 1998 after nearly seven
years during which the region had lacked political and administrative order. Once Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, the military chief of the SSDF,
took charge of the region, stability slowly returned, and a rudimentary
administrative structure was put in place with Garowe as the capital.
A new political structure based on genealogical identity was set up,
similar to many other parts of Somalia. There had been three peaceful
transfers of political authority at the top, although one transition instigated a violent conflict. As such, Puntland, similar to Somaliland, has
been among the most stable and peaceful of all regions. But stability
and peace in the region has not prevented the proliferation of administrative fragmentation as in all other regions of the country. Since it was
established, Puntland’s political leaders divided and subdivided the
territory into nine regions shown in Map 8, largely along genealogical
lines.
Map 8: Regions within Puntland
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The main purpose behind these subdivisions is not to enhance administrative efficiency or accountability but to provide a platform for local
politicians and to support certain groups within the province in the
struggle for dominance in Somalia’s proposed federal system.
VI. Conclusion
The ill effects of artificial colonial boundaries have not been vigorously
debated in recent years as other equally important existential issues
have come to the fore. Yet, the conflicts induced by such borders have
not vanished. For instance, the deadly and costly Ethiopian—Eritrean
war in the late 1990s, which consumed nearly 120,000 lives and led to
the highly militarized border centered on the small town of Badame,
illustrates the living legacy of colonial borders. Be that as it may, more
sinister types of borders have emerged within many countries since
independence. This new demon is fueled by the reinvention of the colonial strategy of divide and rule by small-minded African elites. Political ethnicity and private accumulation using public resources are the
twin instruments the elite have used to create uncivic political and
communal relations that have magnified minor cultural differences
into deadly political rifts. This vicious combination has heavily discounted the appeal of major shared values.
The consequence of this kind of political economy in independent
Africa has been dreadful civil wars that continue to consume millions of lives and fractured social order in many countries.32 These
events have impeded the emergence and the subsequent establishment of broad-based political alliances that would enhance communal
solidarity and national integration. If the original liberation agenda
in the continent was to undo colonial gerrymandering of geographic
and political economic landscapes, to restore the dignity of Africans
through justice and competence in each country, and to advance the
continent to a higher level of solidarity and development, then political
ethnicity and the looting of public resources by the elite have generated lethal conflicts in even the most culturally homogenous nation.
These conflicts have spawned new maps and new borders within countries that have seriously derailed African renaissance. Somalia is the
poster child for these new and ugly politics. A nation endowed with
deep and dense cultural commonalities and a very long history of free
movement of people across the Somali territory had a decent start as
an independent country in 1960. Its birth signaled the removal of one
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of the colonial borders that had artificially divided British and Italian
Somalilands. A central and driving hope among Somalis in the coming
of independence was the reunification of other Somalilands and the
progressive improvement of the quality of life of the population. For
the first decade of independence, progress was made in institutionalizing the rule of law and putting an accountable system of government
in place. But once the sectarian faction of the elite seized power it
began to use public authority to prolong its tenure, loot whatever little
resources the country had, as well as terrorize the population. This
strategy ultimately led to the reemergence of political ethnicity and
social disharmony and fragmentation. The proliferation of Somalia’s
internal administrative boundaries reflects the march of this regressive political schema, eventually ushering in the catastrophic collapse
of the national government. Efforts to resuscitate the Somali state has
been marred by recurring failure as major international actors, neighboring states, the African Union, and Somali factions who profited
from the disorder of the last 30 years, use ethnic criteria to redraw the
political map of the country. In addition, they have endorsed the use
of an ethnic formula to determine representation in parliament and
all political and professional employment in government. Such conflation of ethnic and political identity subverts civic commonalities and
diminishes the likelihood of national recovery and reintegration in the
near future.
The Somali condition may be extreme but it is not exceptional.33 It is
an instantiation of the profane politics that is prevalent in many parts
of the continent. Unless alternative social movements with a more just
socio-economic and political agenda and structures, as well as competent leadership come to the fore to challenge the current order, Somalia
may not remain the poster child for too long; others will follow. The
simmering social disintegration that erupted in places like Kenya (during 2007, 2012, and 2017 elections), and the collapse or near collapse
of others such as the DRC, CAR, Libya, and South Sudan may well
morph into geographic dismemberment. Such an eventuality will put
the hope of African renaissance out of reach for decades to come. This
means that the type of cultural politics inherited from the colonialists
and reinforced by many African elites is pregnant with more catastrophic power than the artificial border lines Europeans drew on the
African map. As Thandika Makandiwire so vividly noted, the human
cost of these internal wars has been nothing short of calamitous. The
occurrence of Africa’s killing fields is the product of this ghastly local
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politics stimulated by the legacy of the international looting machine.
“Democratic elections” and imported cage-like good governance models have not cured the maladies of ethnic politics and associated corrupt
regime of accumulations. To reform the current system will require a
more conscious and far-reaching political and socio-economic agenda
– one whose core values are equity, economic growth, institutional
legitimacy and leadership competence, and the resolute promotion of
civic belonging. Together, these achievements are bound to curtail the
appeal of ethnic identity in politics and the poor’s dependency on their
wealthier and powerful “kinsmen.”
Notes
1. A different version of this paper was published in the South African Geographical
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19. Samatar, 2016: chapter 4.
20. Samatar, 1997; Mamdani, 2004.
21. Samatar, 1992.
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